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NARROWING MEDICAID'S LTC COVERAGE? THE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DRA'S HOME AND
COMMUNITY-BASED CARE BENEFIT
Gene Coffey*
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA)1 contains several
Medicaid provisions that are both controversial and
unabashedly tailored to reduce enrollment in Medicaid longterm care programs. The extension of the asset transfer "look
back" period and modification of the transfer penalty period
methodology are expected to delay eligibility for Medicaid
coverage to more than 100,000 individuals in the next five
years. 2 Meanwhile, the new home equity limits undermine the
homestead exemption historically provided to Medicaid
applicants in the financial eligibility screening process.3
Furthermore, the long battle fought between states and
Medicaid applicants over annuity rules has been resolved in
favor of the states by changes to the annuity rules.4
There is one provision of the DRA that has not received the
same degree of attention that other DRA provisions have, but
Gene Coffey is a staff attorney at the National Senior Citizens Law
Center in Washington, D.C. He received his B.A. from Manhattan
College and his J.D. from Vermont Law School.
1. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (Westlaw current through Sept. 26,
2007).
2. Memorandum from Donald B. Marron, Acting Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to
John M. Spratt Jr., Ranking Member, Comm. on the Budget, U.S. House of
Representatives, (Jan. 27, 2006), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/70xx/doc70
30/sl932updat.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2007).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. 1396p(f)(1)(A) (Westlaw current through Sept. 26, 2007).
4. See generally Mertz v. Houstoun, 155 F. Supp. 2d 415 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
Gillmore v. Dep't. of Human Serv., 843 N.E.2d 336 (Ill. 2006); A.B. v. Div. of Med.
Assistance and Health Serv., 865 A.2d 701 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Fire v.
Dep't of Job and Family Serv., 83 N.E.2d 1257 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
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which may have a notable impact on Medicaid's coverage of
long-term care (LTC). Section 6086 of the DRA, entitled
"Expanded Access to Home and Community-Based Services for
the Elderly and Disabled,"5 allows states to amend their current
plan so that they can offer a package of home and communitybased care services (HCBS) to individuals who would not
otherwise need nursing facility care. 6 Historically, states have
only been authorized to offer HCBS to Medicaid enrollees who
need nursing facility care through Medicaid "waivers".7 Now,
HCBS may be available to more individuals, as the increased
availability may theoretically stave off some enrollees' need for
LTC and help more enrollees live independently in the
community.
As attractive as the new HCBS option sounds, the outcomes
that result from the option may not be as positive as it would
theoretically appear. The statutory language stipulating that
states may narrow their nursing facility (NF) clinical eligibility
standards in order to adopt the option is critical to
understanding the new option's potential impact.8 Coverage for
NF care is guaranteed to Medicaid enrollees who have a medical
need for LTC. 9 States may not limit the number of people to
whom they will provide Medicaid NF coverage.10 However,
some states experiencing a budget crunch resulting from high
LTC costs have modified the "medical need" eligibility standard
in order to reduce the number of eligible enrollees. The problem
with this approach is its arbitrary nature, and states that
manipulate the medical need standard for budgetary purposes
will be exposed to litigation.
However, since the new option contains an express
statutory allowance to change criteria, a state may adopt the new
5. 120 Stat. 4 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6086).
6. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(i).
7. § 1396n(c)-(e); see Julia Belian, State Implementation of the Optional Provisions
of the Deficit Reduction Act, 9 ELDER'S ADVISOR 53, 77-80.
8. § 1396n(i)(1)(B).
9. § 1396a(a)(10)(A).
10. Id.
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option, cap enrollment for the benefit, and narrow the state's NF
clinical standard, thereby reducing the number of people to
whom the state must provide LTC coverage, with significantly
less risk of litigation. Thus, a state's implementation of the new
option may successfully produce a deliberate reduction in
Medicaid coverage instead of an expansion of coverage. Because
states are already preoccupied with figuring out how to shape
their Medicaid LTC programs in preparation for aging Baby
Boomers, and because many states have previously sought to
narrow their NF standard as means of reducing LTC costs, the
new option approach may find some resonance in the offices of
state Medicaid agencies.
The purpose of this article is to examine the new HCBS
option and its potential to narrow NF care entitlement, to
consider the new option in the context of state efforts to modify
clinical eligibility standards, and to identify how far states may
go in making standards more stringent. Ultimately, it is entirely
up to states to decide whether they will use the new option to
expand or contract coverage. Fortunately, the first state to
implement the HCBS option has chosen to use it to expand
coverage."
Still, because of recent efforts by other states to
reduce enrollment by narrowing the NF clinical standard, and
because of pressure states may feel to identify ways to reduce
their LTC obligations, do not lightly dismiss the possibility that
a state may attempt to restrict coverage by using the HCBS
option. It is therefore important to identify the limitations of the
states' ability to do so.
MEDICAID COVERAGE FOR LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES

The new HCBS option is codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(i), and it
is referred to as the "[sitate plan amendment option to provide
home and community-based services for elderly and disabled
11. See IOWA DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., IOWA MEDICAID ENTERPRISE, HCBS
HABILITATION SERVICES PROGRAM, http://www.ime.state.ia.us/HCBS/Habilitation

Services/Info.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2007) [hereinafter HCBS HABILITATION
SERVICES].
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individuals."12 The new option grants states the authority to
offer HCBS to individuals who do not need NF care and have
incomes below 150% of the federal poverty level (FPL) through a
Medicaid state plan amendment.13 This provision is contained
within the statute that allows states to operate HCBS waiver
programs.' 4 A review of HCBS waivers will aid in analyzing the
scope of the new option.
NuRSING FACILITY SERVICES AND

HCBS WAIVERS

HCBS waivers allow states to offer alternatives to NF care.' 5
Specifically, if the state is operating an HCBS waiver, a person
who qualifies for Medicaid and meets state clinical eligibility
standard for NF care may receive HCBS in lieu of institutional
care. 6 NF coverage is mandatory under Medicaid, 7 while
HCBS waivers permit states to provide LTC coverage in a
person's home or other community setting, instead of an
institution.18 If a Medicaid enrollee does not have a medical
need for NF care, he or she generally may not receive coverage
through an HCBS waiver. 9
The package of waiver services may include coverage for
"case management services, homemaker/home health aide
services and personal care services, adult day health services,
habilitation services, respite care services, and such other
services requested by the state as the Secretary may approve." 20
If a state does not operate a HCBS waiver, or if it operates one
12. § 1396n(i).
13. § 1396n(i)(1). In 2007, the FPL is set at $10,210 in annual income for a single
individual; 150% of the 2007 FPL for a single individual is $15,315. See Notice,
Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 72 Fed. Reg. 15, 3147-3148 (Dep't of
Health and Human Serv., Jan. 24, 2007).
14. § 1396n(c)-(e).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a)(4)(A).
18. See § 1396n(c)(1).
19. Id.
20. § 1396n(c)(4)(B). "Other services" may include modifications to a home or
assistive technology, for example.

2007] IMPLICATIONS OF DRA'S HOME CARE BENEFIT

135

but exercises its right to cap enrollment and consequently does
not have an opening, a person who does not want to enter a NF
must rely on services covered under the state's standard
Medicaid program, which might not include coverage for
personal care services or case management services, and may
not include coverage for adult day services or respite care
services.21
The HCBS programs are referred to as "waivers" because a
state can waive certain federal rules if it elects to operate an
HCBS program. If a state wants to restrict eligibility for HCBS
to a discrete geographical area, it can have the mandate codified
at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(1), which requires state-wide
implementation, waived.2 If the state wants to target its HCBS
program to a select population, such as to individuals with
HIV/AIDS or with traumatic brain and spinal cord injuries, the
state may request waiver of the comparability mandate of
section 1396a(a)(10)(B). 2 4 In terms of responsibilities, the statute
requires states to provide assurances to the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services (CMS) that the states have "necessary
safeguards" to protect the health and welfare of HCBS
enrollees, 25 and states are required to submit annual reports on
waiver impacts.2 6 Most notably, the statute also requires that
states' HCBS waivers be budget neutral, which means that a
state cannot spend more on HCBS waiver services than it would
have spent on NF services in the absence of the waiver. 2 7

21. §§ 1396d(a)-(19), -(24).
22. § 1396n(c).
23. § 1396n(c)(3).
24. Id.; "[Section] 1396a(a)(10)(B) creates an equality principle by which all
categorically needy individuals must receive medical assistance which is no less
than that provided to other categorically or medically needy individual." Sobky v.
Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
25. § 1396n(c)(2)(A).
26. § 1396n(c)(2)(E).
27. § 1396n(c)(4)(A).
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THE HCBS OPTIONAL BENEFIT
The new HCBS option allows states to expand HCBS
coverage to a new population of enrollees, and states have the
same freedoms that accompany other waiver programs, but
without the mandates.2 8 First, a state does not have to submit a
formal waiver proposal to adopt the new option, and instead
may simply submit a state plan amendment (SPA) incorporating
the proposal, much like it would do if it were adding an optional
Medicaid service to an existing state coverage plan. 2 9
Additionally, the new option does not have annual reporting
requirements, 30 nor is there a budget neutrality mandate.3 1
Furthermore, a state may have the mandate requiring state-wide
implementation waived, 32 and it may also impose an enrollment
cap. 33 The comparability provision as codified at section
1396a(a)(10)(B) is not specifically identified in section 1396n(i) as
a waivable provision, but it appears from Iowa's approved SPA
that states may tailor eligibility standards to allow it to target the
new option to a specific population.3
However, there are two limitations on a state's delivery of
the new option that are not similarly imposed onto states in
HCBS waiver programs. First, a state's new option may only
cover services specifically identified in section 1396n(c)(4)(B),
but not "other services requested by the State as the Secretary

28. See, e.g., § 1396n(i)(1).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., § 1396n(c)(2)(E) (mandating annual reporting for other waivers and
services). But see § 1396n(i) (requiring no annual reporting).
31. § 1396n(c)(4)(A).
32. § 1396n(i)(3).
33. § 1396n(i)(1)(C)(ii).
34. Iowa's new option limits coverage to individuals who have undergone
psychiatric treatment that was more intensive than outpatient care, or to
individuals with histories of psychiatric illness resulting in at least one episode of
continuous, professional supportive care, other than institutionalization. IOWA
DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., § 1915(i) HCBS STATE PLAN SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
AND OPERATION 6 (2007), http://www.dhs.state.ia.us (search "§1915(i) HCBS State
Plan Services Administration and Operation"; then follow "SMDL #06-" hyperlink)
(last visited Sept. 26, 2007).
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may approve."35 Second, there is the 150% FPL income cap. 36
Federal law specifically allows states to provide HCBS waiver
coverage to individuals with incomes up to 300% of the
Supplemental Security Income Federal Benefit Rate, 37 as well as
to those with higher incomes who qualify as medically needy.3 8
However, the HCBS optional service provision appears to place
a strict income cap on eligibility.39
THE CRITICAL DIFFERENCE

There are noteworthy similarities and differences between
HCBS waivers and the new option, but nothing stands out more
than the differing rules on the clinical eligibility standard. 40 The
new HCBS option is designed strictly for people who do not
need NF care, so the clinical eligibility standard that a state
applies for NF/HCBS waiver services (LTC standard) must be
separate and distinct from the clinical standard that the state
chooses for the new option.4' The next question concerns how a
state should create the new option standard.
The simplest method a state can undertake is to create a
standard less stringent than the state's current LTC standard.
Given that the latter standard represents what the state already
considers to be the dividing line between those who need NF
care and those who does not, and given that the statute requires
that the new option be provided to those who do not need NF
care, this approach seems the simplest and most logical.
35. § 1396n(i)(1).
36. Id.
37. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(VI). For 2007, the S.S.I. FBR for a single individual is
$623 a month; $1,869 in monthly income is 300% of this rate, whereas a single
individual at 150% of the FPL has $1,276 in monthly income. SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
FACT SHEET - 2007 SOCIAL SECURITY CHANGES (2007), http://www.ssa.gov
/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2007.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2007).
38. A "medically needy" person is one who meets the requirements of a
categorical Medicaid population by being aged 65 years or older, and by having
income that above the state's income limit, but insufficient to cover his or her
medical expenses. See . § 1396a(a)(10)(C).
39.

§

1396n(i)(1).

40. §§ 1396n(i)(1)-(A), -(B).
41.

§

1396n(i)(1)(B).
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However, the statutory language appears to envision a very
different alternative for states. 42 The law expressly permits a
state to make its LTC standard more stringent in order to adopt
the new option.4 3
For example, suppose a state that wishes to adopt the new
option currently requires people seeking LTC coverage
eligibility to demonstrate a need for assistance with three
activities of daily living (ADL)." In order to adopt the new
option, the state could simply apply a two ADL eligibility
standard in order to satisfy the requirement that the new option
standard differ from the state's LTC standard.4 5 Again, this
seems to be the most logical approach.
Specifically, if the state already considers a person with
three ADLs to need NF care, a person receiving benefits
designed for individuals who do not need NF care should have
to meet a less stringent standard than the three ADL standard. 46
However, the law allows a state to narrow the NF/HCBS waiver
standard to four ADLs, and adopt three ADLs as the standard

42. Id.

43. Id.
44. Activities of daily living include, among others, eating, bathing, dressing,
walking, toilet use, and grooming. Many consider the LTC standards that are based
strictly on an ADL test as too narrow, in that they do not adequately gauge an
For example, a person with a cognitive
individual's functional capacity.
impairment may be able to perform a full range of ADLs, but he or she may need
significant prompting to do the tasks, as well as supervision during the task. See,
e.g., JANET O'KEEFE, AARP PUB. POLICY INST., PEOPLE WITH DEMENTIA: CAN THEY
MEET MEDICAID LEVEL-OF-CARE CRITERIA FOR ADMISSION TO NURSING HOMES AND
HOME AND COMMuNITY-BASED WAIVER PROGRAMS? 1-4 (1999), available at

http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/9912_dementia.pdf. The use of the ADL test
as an illustration is not meant to imply that strict ADL tests are more popular or
even preferable, but rather, to demonstrate the impact that the new option may
have on state LTC standards in the most straightforward fashion. However, it
should be noted that the statutory language specifically grants states the authority
to apply a strict ADL test for the new option. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(i)(1)(D)(i).
45. § 1396n(i)(1)(B).
46. The statute allows for the continuation of federal financial participation
(FFP) for NF or HCBS waiver services provided to people who qualified under the
former less stringent standard, "without regard to whether such individuals satisfy
the more stringent eligibility criteria established under [the statute] until such time
as the individual is discharged from the institution or waiver program or no longer
requires such level of care." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(i)(H)(5).
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for the new option. 47 If a state adopted this approach, Medicaid
entitlement to NF care would narrow. Individuals applying for
LTC coverage with assistance needs in exactly three ADLs, who
were formerly guaranteed coverage for some form of LTC
services, would now only be covered if the state had room on a
finite list.48 Even if there was room, the income cap on the
benefit could bar coverage; such a bar that would not be
imposed if the person was eligible for LTC.49
WHICH WAY WILL STATES GO AND How FAR CAN THEY Go?

Under the federal law, states have the authority to tighten their
clinical LTC standard in order to adopt the new option.5 0 The
question remains whether states will take this direction. Iowa,
which was the very first state to receive approval, did not.51
Instead, Iowa chose to expand coverage through the new

option. 5 2
However, while it is good news that one state has expanded
coverage through the new option, this news is tempered by
some harsh realities.
First, LTC is extremely expensive;
Medicaid paid $193 billion for LTC in 2004,53 and this amount is
expected to double in the next ten years." Second, it is no secret
that when costs increase, states consider tightening their clinical
eligibility standard for LTC coverage.55 Within the last five
47. Id.
48. § 1396n(i)(1)(C)(ii).
49. § 1396n(i)(1) (limiting eligibility to those with incomes not greater than
150% of the federal poverty level).
50. § 1396n(i)(1)(B).
51. See HCBS HABILITATION SERVICES PROGRAM, supra note 11.
52. Id.
53. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAID LONG-TERM CARE FEW
TRANSFERRED ASSETS BEFORE APPLYING FOR NURSING HOME COVERAGE; IMPACT OF
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT ON ELIBIGILITY IS UNCERTAIN 1, (Mar. 2007), available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07280.pdf.
54. Id. (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, STATEMENT BEFORE THE U.S. SENATE
SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, MEDICAID SPENDING GROWTH AND OPTIONS FOR
CONTROLLING COSTS (July 2006).
55. JANET O'KEEFE ET AL., ALZHEIMER'S ASS'N, MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
FOR LONG TERM CARE SERVICES: ACCESS FOR PEOPLE WITH ALZHEIMER's DISEASE
AND OTHER DEMENTIAS 1 (2006), available at http://www.alz.org/national/doc
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years, at least three states - Kentucky, Oregon, and West
Virginia - have changed their LTC standards to reduce costs,
well before they have actually experienced the increased
demand that the growth of the aging population is expected to
create.5 6 Iowa's decision to leave its LTC standard alone and to
expand coverage through adoption of the new option does not
necessarily eliminate the fear that other states may use the new
option to reduce coverage by tightening standards.
OTHER OPTIONS

Interestingly, a third approach exists between the
contrasting approaches of expanding coverage and tightening
LTC standards. Specifically, Vermont's Choices for Care (CFC)
Medicaid waiver, 7 which was implemented in October 2005,58
guarantees coverage for non-institutional LTC services to all
individuals who meet the state's LTC clinical eligibility
standard. 59 CFC also monitors the program's growth by using a
spending cap for those on the lower end of the clinical
spectrum.60
The starting point in CFC was the split of Vermont's single
LTC clinical eligibility standard into three standards: highest
need, high need, and moderate need. 61 Individuals who meet
the highest need standard are entitled to choose either NF
uments/Medicaideligibilityissues.pdf.
56. See Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). See also Kate Long,
W. Va. Made Same Medicaid Cuts as Ky., Both States Ended Up Restoring In-Home Care,
THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 8, 2007, at Al. See generally Kerr v. Holsinger, No.
03-68-JMH, 2004 WL 882203 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 25,2004).
57. Social Security "Demonstration Projects" allow for the creation of the CFC.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1315 (Westlaw current through Sept. 26, 2007).
58. KAISER COMM'N. ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE VERMONT
CHOICES FOR CARE LONG-TERM CARE PLAN: KEY PROGRAM CHANGES AND

QUESTIONS 1 (2006), http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7540.pdf (last visited
Sept. 26, 2007) [hereinafter KEY PROGRAM CHANGES AND QUESTIONS].
59. CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERV., STATE OF VERMONT "CHOICES
FOR CARE" DEMONSTRATION WAIVER OPERATIONAL PROTOCOL 25 (2005), available at
http://ddas.vermont.gov/ddas-publications/publications-cfc/publications-cfcdocuments/cfc-1115-oprational-protocol [hereinafter CHOICES FOR CARE].
60. Id. at 26.
61. Id. at 3.
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coverage or community-based coverage.62 Enrollees who meet
the high need standard are also entitled to make the same
choices, but they only get coverage for services if funding is
available. 63 Moderate need individuals are entitled to a small
package of community-based services, including case
management, as well as homemaker or adult day services, and
they too only receive coverage for the services if funding is
available.64
The highest need standard is more stringent than the
standard Vermont had applied prior to implementation of CFC,
meaning that the state narrowed the entitlement to LTC when it
adopted the program. 65 The high need standard is most
comparable to the old standard, and Vermont's high need
population is akin to the population eligible for the new option
in a state that narrows its LTC standard. Previously, members
of this population would have been entitled to at least NF care
coverage; now, they may only get coverage for services if there
is funding available and room within an enrollment cap. 66
However, CFC does not apply different financial eligibility
rules to highest need and high need individuals, and it allows
people with incomes up to 300% of the Supplemental Security
Income Federal Benefit Rate and people who are medically
needy to qualify. 67
Additionally, spouses of high need
individuals are entitled to the spousal impoverishment

62. VT. DEP'T OF AGING AND DISABLITIES, THE VERMONT LONG-TERM CARE
PLAN: A DEMONSTRATION WAIVER PROPOSAL TO THE CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID SERVICES 3 (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://ddas.vermont.gov/ddaspolicies/policies-cfc/policies-cfc-documents/1115-ltc-waiver-demonstration-noappendices [hereinafter VERMONT LONG-TERM CARE PLAN].
63. CHOICES FOR CARE, supranote 59, at 3.
64. Id. at 26.
65. VERMONT LONG-TERM CARE PLAN, supra note 62, at 11.
66. For a comparison between Vermont's former standard and the CFC's
highest and high need standards, see VT. DIV. OF DISABILITY AND AGING SERV.,
VERMONT 1115 DEMONSTRATION, THE VERMONT LONG-TERM CARE PLAN:
RESPONSES TO DECEMBER 2003 QUESTIONS FROM CMS attachments A-C, app. D (Jan.
12, 2004), available at http://ddas.vermont.gov/ddas-policies/policies-cfc/policies-cfcdocuments/responses-questions-1115-federal-review.
67. VERMONT LONG-TERM CARE PLAN, supra note 62, at 23.
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protections of section 1396r-5. 68 Moreover, Vermont has placed
a spending cap on the high need population, not an enrollment
cap. 69 Vermont is counting on the increased availability of noninstitutional services to reduce overall Medicaid LTC spending,
which Vermont hopes will enable its program to serve all who
meet the high need standard. 70 Thus, while CFC narrowed the
LTC entitlement, it did not constrict other eligibility
requirements; it is designed to provide coverage to all enrollees
who need LTC, and even to those who do not (i.e., those meeting
the moderate need standard 71 ).
Vermont's program has received a significant amount of
attention. Indeed, the front page of the Wall Street Journal
declared that CFC is "an effort being watched around the
nation." 72 But there is a problem: the starting point in Vermont's
effort to control LTC spending was a change in the Medicaid
A state that wants to
LTC clinical eligibility standard.73
incorporate this as part of rebalancing Medicaid LTC may still
view the new option as the more expedient alternative. First,
CFC is still very new, so it may be too soon for state
policymakers to declare it a success. Second, it took Vermont
almost two years to receive approval for the CFC waiver,74 a
process from which states may shy away. Lastly, CMS imposes
requirements that accompany the waiver, including a budget

68. See generally § 1396r-5.
69. VERMONT LONG-TERM CARE PLAN, supra note 62, at 4.

70. Id. at 2-4.
71. Id.

72. Lucette Lagnado, Olden Days, Seniors in Vermont are Finding They Can Go
Home Again: In Shift From Nursing Homes, State Has Family Members Carefor Elderly
Relatives, Helping Gram at $9.25 an Hour, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2006, at Al, available at
http://www.cashandcounseling.org/news/20061023-112909/VTArticle.pdf.
73. "We recognize that tightening the criteria for institutional care is at the core
of your proposal . . . ." VT. DEP'T OF AGING AND DISABLITIES, SUPPLEMENTAL
QUESTIONS: VERMONT LONG-TERM CARE PLAN RESPONSES FROM VERMONT 11

(2003), available at http://ddas.vermont.gov/ddas-publications/publications-cfc/pub
lications-cfc-documents/1115-waiver-responses-second-round-questions-CMS
[hereinafter VERMONT LONG-TERM CARE PLAN RESPONSES].
74. In October of 2003, Vermont submitted to CMS the final version of CFC,
which received approval in June of 2005. See CHOICES FOR CARE, supra note 59, at
25; KEY PROGRAM CHANGES AND QUESTIONS, supra note 58, at 1.
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neutrality mandate and reporting requirements, both of which
would not apply to the new option.75
Thus, despite the directions chosen by Iowa and Vermont,
the incentive for states to tighten their clinical LTC standards
may still be too strong for them to resist. With this possibility
looming, it is important to at least identify the existing limits on
states' authority to narrow the standards.
SKILLED NURSING FACILITY CARE

At minimum, a tightened clinical LTC standard cannot
become a skilled standard. Skilled NF care is the highest level of
care provided in a NF, and it includes services provided on a
daily basis, such as intravenous feeding, insertion and
replacement of catheters, and care of a colostomy. 76 Services
such as overall management of a care plan, as well as
observation and assessment of an individual's condition, may
also qualify as skilled services, so long as the skills of a technical
or professional person are required.7 7 Skilled care is commonly
provided in a separate NF, and the Medicare program is the
primary insurer of skilled care.78
Historically, Medicaid mandated coverage for skilled care
while treating "intermediate" NF care as a discretionary
Medicaid service to be elected by the states at will. This changed
in 1987 when Congress deleted the word "skilled" from the
statutory provision identifying the mandatory Medicaid service,

75. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., SPECIAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS
OF APPROVAL: VERMONT LONG-TERM CARE PLAN 1115 DEMONSTRATION 3-4 (2003),
available at http://ddas.vermont.gov/ddas-policies/policies-cfc/policies-cfc-docum
ents/1115-1tc-waiver-special-terms-conditions.
76. 42 C.F.R. §§ 409.31(b)(1), 409.33(b) (2006). See generally CTR. FOR MEDICARE
ADVOCACY, 2007 MEDICARE HANDBOOK § 3:03[D] (Judith A. Stein & Alfred J.
Chiplin eds., 2007) [hereinafter 2007 MEDICAID HANDBOOK).

77. 42 C.F.R. § 409.33(a) (2006).
78. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., MEDICARE COVERAGE OF

SKILLED NURSING FACLITY CARE 5 (Apr. 2002), available at http://www.medicare
.gov/publications/pubs/pdf/snf.pdf. See also 2007 MEDICAID HANDBOOK, supra note
76.
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thus entitling beneficiaries to "nursing facility services."79
Under the broader nursing facilities services definition, an
enrollee may be eligible for Medicaid coverage if he or she has a
mental or physical condition requiring services "above the level
of room and board," which "can be made available only through
institutional facilities." 0 This is commonly referred to as a
"custodial" level of care.81
Although a state narrows the allowances granted by the
federal law when it limits its definition of NF care to skilled care,
it might still try to apply a skilled standard as the clinical
standard for Medicaid LTC eligibility.8 2 A lawsuit currently
pending in Maryland alleges that the state Medicaid agency
applies a skilled LTC clinical standard when determining
Medicaid eligibility.83 Maryland's standard requires a person to
need services that can be provided only "under the supervision
of licensed health care professionals."4 The plaintiffs allege that
the clause renders the Medicaid LTC eligibility standard a
skilled standard because the requirement only appears in the
definition of skilled nursing facility care within the Code of
Federal Regulations.85
Vermont also encountered problems with CMS on this issue
when it shaped the CFC's highest need standard.8 6 After
initially reviewing Vermont's proposal, CMS said,
Your proposal appears to restrict the nursing facility
benefit to individuals who require the skilled nursing
care and related services described in subparagraph (A)
79. See OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCLIATION AcT OF 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§
4211(h)(6)(A)-(C), 101 Stat. 1330-206 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§
1396d(a)(4),-(14), -(15) (1987)).
80. 42 C.F.R. § 440.155(a) (2006).
81. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.15(g) (2006); See also HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, 1
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES § 2:28 (4th ed. 2007).
82. See City Order of COSA to Proceed, Flowers v. Colmers, No. 24-06-773 (Cir.
Ct. Baltimore, Md. July 23, 2007) (on file with author). See generally 42 C.F.R. §
440.155(a).
83. Id.

84. MD. CODE REGS. 10.09.10.01B(31) (2007).
85. 42 C.F.R. § 409.32(a) (2006); City Order of COSA to Proceed, Flowers v.
Colmers, No. 24-06-773 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore, Md. July 23, 2007).
86. VERMONT LONG-TERM CARE PLAN RESPONSES, supra note 73, at 9-15.
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The nursing facility
[of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r(a)(1)] ....
benefit may not be restricted in this manner. The intent
of Congress in OBRA '87 was clearly to combine the
Intermediate Care Facility and Skilled Nursing Facility
level of care into a single benefit.8 7
In the CFC's final form, the highest need standard does not
appear to require an individual to need skilled care.88
Even as some states may flirt with the idea of imposing a
skilled standard, does any LTC standard that is less than skilled
become unassailable? Can a state amend its LTC standard to
something slightly below "skilled" in order to adopt the new
Historically, the answer has appeared to be no.
option?
Keeping a standard below skilled has not necessarily been
enough, as other Medicaid statutory provisions curtail state

discretion. 8 9
MEDICAL NECESSITY AND REASONABLE ELIGIBILITY STANDARDS

Medicaid's reasonable standards provision is the primary
provision at issue in this context. In providing mandatory
coverage of NF services, federal law requires states to develop
"reasonable standards" for determining eligibility. 90 This has
been interpreted to require that state Medicaid plans provide
"medically necessary" treatment in order for the plans to
"comport with the objectives of the Act." 91 "The concept of
medical necessity is the set measure-the touchstone-for
evaluating the reasonableness of a participating state's Medicaid

standards." 9 2
87. Id. at 11.
88. VT. DEP'T OF DISABIUTIES, AGING, AND INDEPENDENT LIVING, CHOICES FOR
CARE: LONG-TERM CARE MEDICAID PROGRAM MANUAL II.-1, 11-2 (revised Nov.

2006), available at http://ddas.vermont.gov/ddas-policies/policies-cfc/policies-cfchighest/policies-cfc-highest-documents/policies-cfc-highest-documents/cfc-highmanual-section-2.
89. See Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 197-98 (8th Cir. 1989).
90. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(17).
91. Weaver, 886 F.2d at 198 (emphasis added).
92. Jasset v. R.I. Dep't of Human Serv., No. C.A. PC 05-3815, 2006 WL 2169891
(R.I. Super. July 31, 2006) (citing Allen v Mansour, 681 F.Supp. 1232, 1237
(E.D. Mich. 1986)).
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In evaluating whether a treatment for an applicant is a
medical necessity, a state must at least consider the opinion of
the applicant's treating physician.93 However, the state does not
have to defer entirely to the treating physician's opinion. 94
Indeed, states are "free to define medical necessity as broadly or
as narrowly as required to fulfill the state's policy goals."95 With
regard to a state's LTC clinical eligibility standard, at least one
court has held that a state is not required to consider all aspects
of a person's condition when determining whether he or she
"needs" care.9 6
Ultimately, the Medicaid Act and its regulations both
protect and limit the states' discretion."97 Generally, states have
discretion to develop their own clinical LTC standard, and very
few standards are similar to one another. 9 But where the
principles of the medical necessity "touchstone" and the
states' discretion to define it collide is when a state
attempts to change its clinical eligibility standard, and a
perfect example of this collision recently occurred in
Kentucky.99
KERR V. HOLSINGER: LIMITS ON MEDICAL NECESSITY

In 2003, Kentucky tightened its Medicaid LTC clinical
eligibility standard in order to reduce $45 million from the
state's Medicaid budgetyE The state had previously required
applicants and beneficiaries to demonstrate a need for assistance

93. Paleski v. State Dep't of Health Serv., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 28, 39 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006); Holman v. Dep't of Human Servs., 757 N.E.2d 382, 388-89 (Ohio Ct. App.
2001).
94. Cowan v. Myers, 232 Cal.Rptr. 299, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Thie v.
Davis, 688 N.E.2d 182, 188 (Ind.App. 1997).
95. Holman, 757 N.E.2d at 387.
96. Cherry v. Tompkins, No. 1-94-460, 1995 WL 502403 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31,
1995) (citing Alexandar v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985)).
97. Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755, 759 (8th Cir. 2001).
98. See, e.g., O'KEEFE ET AL., supra note 55, at 3.
99. See Kerr v. Holsinger, No. 03-68-JMH, 2004 WL 882203 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 25,
2004).
100. Id.
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with two ADLs among a list of twelve, but then the state
reduced the list to nine and increased the ADL showing to
three.'01 As a result, more than 3,000 Medicaid beneficiaries that
had previously received coverage for NF or HCBS care lost
eligibility. 102
A suit was brought on behalf of Medicaid applicants and
beneficiaries to challenge the changes made to Kentucky's
Medicaid LTC clinical eligibility standard. 0 3 The plaintiffs
alleged that the state altered the clinical eligibility standard
solely to reduce state Medicaid LTC spending, and no evidence
indicated that the change was prompted by a medical review's
finding that the prior standard was an inaccurate gauge of a
person's need for LTC.104 As such, the plaintiffs asserted that
application of the new standard should be enjoined because it
was illegal for the state to change the clinical eligibility standard
of a mandatory Medicaid service for the sole purpose of
reducing state Medicaid spending. 0 5
The Kerr court agreed. 0 6 The court recognized that states,
in fact, have discretion to establish standards of need, and they
may make budget-motivated decisions when shaping the scope
of Medicaid programs.0 7 However, the court held that changing
a medical need standard to suit the state budget was not within
the bounds of state discretion. 0 The court stated:
Medicaid regulations adopted for the wrong reasons,
i.e., without a Medicaid-related or a health-related
purpose, are contrary to the purposes of the Act
because they are inherently arbitrary, unreasonable and
invalid.
Thus, reducing mandatory benefits to
qualified recipients by manipulating eligibility
standards in order to make up for budget deficits is
101. Id. See 907 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:022 (2007).

102. Medicaid; Kentucky's Governor Asks for Patience from Advocates of Rescinding
Program Cuts, HEALTH & MED. WK., Jan 12, 2004, at 641.
103. Kerr, 2004 WL 882203.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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unreasonable and inconsistent with Medicaid objectives
because it exposes recipients to whimsical and arbitrary
decisions which the Act seeks to avoid. Focusing solely
on budgetary concerns simply does not rise to the level
of a reasonable standard for determining eligibility for
long-term care services and is inconsistent with
Medicaid objectives. 109
Thus, it seems that Kerr stands for the proposition that a
state's motivation is fair game for scrutiny when a state changes
its Medicaid LTC clinical eligibility standard. A state standard
may be safe from challenge if it is not "skilled," but where the
standard is altered, a state must be prepared to show that the
alteration did not relate solely to the state's financial position.o1 0
A state may still face problems regarding standard changes,
even with a non-financial motive for altering its Medicaid LTC
standard.'
Such an alteration has the potential to become a
public relations nightmare for a state. 112 In Kentucky, the
changes prompted a grassroots coalition of Medicaid advocates
to participate in community protests, which induced the
governor to direct communication." 3 In 2006, West Virginia
similarly attempted to modify its clinical LTC standard to
reduce the HCBS Waiver population, and the public and
legislative outcry was intense.114
The governor ultimately
ordered the state agency to settle a lawsuit brought on behalf of
HCBS enrollees on the eve of a preliminary injunction hearing." 5
The issue of whether strict budgetary considerations
motivated plan changes was the common element involving the
changes put forth by Kentucky and West Virginia. For purposes
109. Id.
110. See generally id.
111. See generally id.
112. Id.
113. Karla Ward, Crowd Protests Cuts in Medicaid: Fletcher Says Goal is to Restore
Care, Asks for Patience, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER, Dec. 17, 2003, at B6.
114. See, e.g., Susan Williams, Disability Community Speaks Up About Medicaid
Waiver Cuts, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, July 6, 2006, at A2; Shortsighted Medicaid at
Home, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 4, 2006, at A4; Kate Long, Payingfor InHome Care a Secret Medicaid Overhaul: Lawmakers Kept in Dark Amid Drastic Cutbacks,
THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 7,2007, at Al.
115. See Long, supra note 56, at Al.
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of a potential legal battle, it seems imperative that the state be
able to justify a changed standard on other grounds." 6
Of course, one justification for a change in standards that
seems rarely asserted, at least in the context of clinical LTC
standards, is that a modification directly resulted from input by
medical professionals who concluded that the prior standard
insufficiently evaluated medical need."' For example, in 1980,
the Eighth Circuit held that Iowa's refusal to provide coverage
for sex reassignment surgeries violated the Medicaid Act's
medically necessary standard"i8 because the state "had not
consulted medical professionals, and had disregarded the
current accumulated knowledge of the medical community."" 9
In 2001, the Eighth Circuit again visited the issue of Iowa's
refusal to cover sex reassignment surgeries, and this time ruled
in the state's favor; the state, post-Pinneke, had contracted with a
federally designated medical peer review organization, which
recommended that Iowa not cover the surgeries because of "the
lack of consensus in the medical community [about the surgery's
appropriateness] and the availability of other treatment

options."120
However, recent examples of state changes to clinical LTC
standards are seemingly not products of similar medical
community evaluations, and the absence of such evaluations
should make alterations inherently suspect. The statutory
language of the new option expressly allows a state to change
the standard, which would seem to support a state seeking to
justify a change. But given the principles from the cases
described above, the question exists whether the limits of states'
discretion can be ascertained.

116. See id. See also Ward, supra note 113.
117. See Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Smith v.
Rasmussen, 249 F.3d at 755.
118. Pinneke, 623 F.2d at 549-50.
119. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d at 760 (citing Pinneke, 623 F.2d at 549-50).
120. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d at 760.
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CONSIDERING THE NEw OPTION

Courts have struggled with Medicaid-related issues in
litigation, 121 and their struggle will likely increase if courts are
forced to balance the express statutory authority allowing states
to tighten a clinical LTC standard against the limits on that
authority imposed by section 1396(a)(17).
For now, the
opposing goals seem rather clear, but there is a potential for
battle over the area in between.
A state that tightens its clinical LTC standard to adopt the
new benefit may not render its LTC standard a skilled
standard.122 To interpret section 1396n(i) as a provision allowing
for a state to tighten its clinical standards in order to make its
new standard "skilled" is to interpret the section as impliedly
repealing OBRA '87's Medicaid amendments. 123 A court will not
do this in the absence of "a clearly established congressional
intention,"1 24 and no such intent to allow for skilled standards
through section 1396n(i) exists.125
By the same token, it seems easy to identify the safest course
for a state to take. Consider again the ADL test discussed.126
Where a state applies a three-ADL test as its clinical LTC
121. The Mertz court recognized the difficulty in interpreting the Medicare Act
itself. "The Medicaid Act is actually a morass of interconnecting legislation. It
contains provisions which are circuitous and, at best, difficult to harmonize. The
Act has been called 'an aggravated assault on the English language, resistant to
attempts to understand it."' Mertz, 155 F.Supp.2d at 420 n.6 (quoting Schweiker v.
Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43, (1981)). "The Medicaid Act has been characterized
as one of the 'most completely impenetrable texts in human existence,' and 'dense
reading of the most tortuous kind."' Mertz, 155 F.Supp.2d at 420 n.6 (quoting
Rehabilitation Ass'n of Va. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1450 (4th Cir. 1994)). "The
court has nothing but sympathy for officials who must interpret or administer the
Act." Mertz, 155 F.Supp.2d at 420 n.6.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
535 (1974)). "An implied repeal will only be found where provisions in two statutes
are in 'irreconcilable conflict,' or where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the
earlier one and 'is clearly intended as a substitute."' Morton, 417 U.S. at 535
(quoting Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
125. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396n(i). See also Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4211(h)(6)(A), 101
Stat. 1330-206 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(A) (1987)).
126. See § 1396n(i)(5). See generally Kerr, 2004 WL 882203.
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standard, a change that results in applying the same three ADL
test to the new option, and a four-ADL test as the new LTC
standard, will be very hard to challenge so long as the four-ADL
test is not a skilled standard.127 This course resembles Vermont's
approach, where the high need standard is comparable to the
state's former LTC standard, and individuals with greater needs
fall into the highest need category and are guaranteed
coverage.128 The bottom line is that section 1396n(i) specifically
allows states to make changes. In this example, the change is
essentially gradual, and there exists at least some connection
between the former standard and the new standard.129 Because
a court will have to give meaning to the statutory allowance for
a change, it will likely look at this example as one envisioned by
Congress when it enacted the statute.13 0
Between these ends is where disputes will focus. Suppose a
state raises its clinical LTC standard from three to five ADLs,
and then also applies the three-ADL test as the standard for the
new option. In this scenario, the state will have formerly
guaranteed coverage to people needing assistance in three and
four ADLs or more. However, in adopting the new benefit, the
state will have preserved coverage, albeit more limited, for
people with needs in three ADLs, and it will have eliminated
coverage entirely for those with four.131 This approach could
easily expose the state to claims of arbitrariness.
Conversely, if the gap between old and new coverage plans
creates problems for a state, what if the state decides to make the
new option standard four ADLs, and the LTC standard five? In
this scenario, can a state allege that the basis for the change was

127. See generally § 1396n(i)(5).
128. VERMONT LONG-TERM CARE PLAN RESPONSES, supra note 73, at 1-15.
129. See §§ 1396a(a), 1396n(i). See also Kerr, 2004 WL 882203.
130. The specific allowance in the statute for grandfathering current enrollees
may further help a state's cause, from both a legal and public relations standpoint.
The Kentucky and West Virginia agencies were hurt by the fact that they
terminated individuals who had experienced no improvement in their medical
conditions since they qualified for Medicaid coverage. See § 1396n(i); Long, supra
note 116, at Al.
131. See, e.g., O'KEEFE ET AL., supra note 56.
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the adoption of the new option? Individuals who formerly were
guaranteed coverage for some form of LTC(individuals with
needs in strictly three ADLs) would be considered medically
ineligible for LTC altogether. If these individuals cannot even
receive coverage under the new option, they may raise
allegations that adopting the new option was not the sole basis
for the coverage change. 132
A state would not want to find itself having to answer
questions concerning what other basis justified the coverage
change. Again, the statute specifically allows for a tightening of
the LTC standard for the purpose of adopting the new option.133
But just as the statute cannot be read to have repealed the
Medicaid Act's prohibition on a skilled LTC standard, it cannot
be read to have repealed the reasonable standards mandate,
which among other things, limits the state's ability to change a
standard of medical need."' The further a state moves away
from its former standard in adopting the new option, the more
the reasonable standards provision will be implicated.'3
CONCLUSION

Pinpointing where the statutory grant allowing states to change
a clinical LTC standard ends and where a violation of the
reasonable standards mandate begins will likely challenge
courts.136 Courts are apt to confront this dilemma where a state
changes its policies in a way that appears to interfere with an
individual's ability to obtain Medicaid LTC coverage.' 7 States
will soon face the extraordinary task of providing LTC coverage

132. See Kerr, 2004 WL 882203.
133. See § 1396n(i).
134. See Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4211(h)(6)(A), 101 Stat. 1330-206 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(A) (Westlaw current through Sept. 26, 2007).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(i).
135. See § 1396n(i). See generally §§ 1396a(a)(17).
136. See Edward Alan Miller, State Discretion and Medicaid Program Variation in
Long-Term Care: When Is Enough, Enough?, 14 J. AGING & SOC. POL'Y 15, 16 (2002)
(discussing the court's interaction of state and federal Medicaid regulations).
137. See id.
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for the booming aging population, and states may wish for even
greater discretion is establishing state coverage plans.138
However, as the recent stories from Kentucky and West Virginia
demonstrate, manipulating a standard of medical need to reduce
outlays is fraught with problems.139 Even though states have
received some encouragement by Congress to pursue this path,
it is not a good approach to take.
Ideally, states should monitor the progress of Vermont and
Iowa closely before deciding to use their discretion to constrict
coverage by way of the new option. Certainly in the case of
Vermont, and to a lesser extent Iowa, the aim is to emphasize
community-based choices as a method of monitoring LTC costs.
States have been more willing to seek Money Follows the Person
grants, 40 a program designed to deemphasize the Medicaid
program's reliance on and bias toward institutional care as the
delivery method for LTC.
Policymakers, consumers, and
advocates seem to strongly support the movement toward
community-based care. There is still time to study the impact
that significantly increased reliance on the delivery method will
have on state programs before resorting to the sort of rationing
that the new options statute allows.

138. See id. at 29.
139. Long, supra note 56, at Al.
140. The Money Follows the Person program provides federal grants to states
that allow them move people who are receiving Medicaid coverage in nursing
facilities back to the community in order to "[iincrease the use of home and
community-based, rather than institutional, long-term care services." 120 Stat. 4
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a). Seventeen states were awarded
grants in the first round of awards. CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERV.,
MONEY FOLLOWS THE PERSON REBALANCING DEMONSTRATION: FIRST TIER AWARD

SUMMARY, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DeficitReductionAct/Downloads/Stateslst%2
OTierweb(2).pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2007); see also Belian, supra note 7, at 83-4.
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